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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Sun Feb 28, 2016 6:48 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

an addenda of sorts to Friday's post
The ‘is’ in Plato is never the copula in a merely categorizing way but has more the meaning of ‘sharing-in’ (metechein). For example ‘The beautiful is good’ doesn’t mean ‘the good’ is predicated of ‘the beautiful’ (a mere linguistic/categorical construction). Predication would force ‘good’ to become a universal (katholos) and would confer an infinite or indefinite status upon it rather than absolute. This would surely sit uneasily upon a Platonic Form, I think, for Good and Beauty are individuals or Ones. Their blending in the sentence above is nothing less than a shared light. In Aristotle, if we continue the ‘light’/’being’ analogy, the light shines outward /upward from any Primary Being towards species and genus. These latter are, as in the quote in previous posts from Theta 9, mere potentialities. Thus the ousia shines forth into its categories. They are universals, not true eide, they are also potentialities, are they not?

‘Socrates’, or if it pleases you more, ‘a particular existing human being, is white’. ‘White’ is the category, the universal predicated (not, for Aristotle, sharing – metechein) of the individual man.

For Plato, as every Platonist should know, things are the other way round. Light shines ‘down’ from the eidos. There is no 'mere' quality until it is shared by a participating being. Of course ‘quality’ wasn’t a term bandied around by Plato until Theaetetus, I believe, and even after that he used the term sparingly but to telling effect (cf. Timaeus). And ‘becoming’ – gignomenon – the sharing of a perishable object with an eternal shining eidos is contingent on being, as we know from Sophist.

Take ‘Theaetetus is knowledgeable’; here knowing/knowledge is the imperishable eidos, and the talented geometrician shares – metachein - in this eidos. I see no necessity at all in Plato’s teaching for energeia and I doubt if he ever used the word.
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PostPosted: Mon Feb 29, 2016 3:12 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
““knowledge and intelligence and true opinion regarding these objects”
: Heidegger says, with great insight, the simple unity of all these at once is meant. And it is therefore no knowledge, as Plato says explicitly, it is not the episteme. The episteme is the fourth thing. Is that not clear in the text? This Heidegger shows most clearly in his analysis of the Drinking Party. It is not an assent to the definition proffered by Socrates, but a disclosure of the breadth of that eidos.

I wonder if one is justified in saying that ‘form’ shows so-called Aristotle’s (the name taken as title of a subject like algebra, and not as something that points to a peculiar or unique individual who lived and belonged to a certain Polis, which surely is no longer present in modern Athens) interest in the non-moral things, in contradistinction to idea, which one might say, points to the subject matter of Socrates. It seems that Aristotle asks about the essence of nature, and answers: it is change and motion. But, he does not mean visible motion, but essential motion. I.e., in plain speach, not making a shoe, but the readiness to make it that the master cobbler is supposed to posses. So, with nature, not some thing changing, but the readiness to set the things going. Surely we can see the connection with the Christian idea of omnipotence. But the Greeks do not deal with a transcendent god. The talk of imminence is as alien to them as the talk of transcendence.

I think here the autos episteme, which is understood by the translator to say something like episteme itself, though translated as ‘absolute’ knowledge, in accordance with the style of German Idealism, is not comparable to the Indian idea. For the reason that it follows the sense found in the letter, which ultimately all thought in the school rested on. Thus, we might venture to think of the saying found in Daoism: the dao that daos is not the dao. (One can see readily that this is usually wholly effaced in our common translations.) One might, I say, compare these two concepts, that in the letter, and that in Daoism, with some profit. Only that. They are specific and have grown into the people who denoted them differently. They do not speak in the same fashion at all, but yet there is something that leads us to the Greeks in this Daoism. Or puts us in a closer mood. The living tradition of Daoism seems closer to us, whereas the Greek tradition was effaced millennia ago.

I forgo this Theaetetus bit, since I believe you must not reject the contention that episteme is the fourth thing, and not the fifth named in the letter. It should go without saying to any serious reader of that document. I.e., episteme itself, is not the fifth thing itself. No, it is self knowledge. But the self is not the highest thing, understanding that our language covers up the issue, and misleads us with some violence at this point.

What might be helpful is a glance at the Megarian issue. The Megarian position is that, e.g., the shoemaker can not make shoes simply because everyone calls him a master cobbler. He may be a master, and he may have gathered some skill, but can he be said to have the power to effect the becoming of a shoe, at just any moment? We must see him do it! We all know that a man who can make shoes, might be drunk. He might be sick. He might have a spasm in his hand even at the moment when his materials lie waiting before him to be worked. I ask you this, is Aristotle headless when he says, this man has the skill simply? He has it or doesn't?

Now, Aristotle can not be regarded as so stupid that he is not familiar with the fact that men sometimes grow old and lose a skill that they once had. Neither can he be unaware that the skill might sometimes not be present in any living man. Mustn't he know of the eternal form of shoemaking? Is it reasonable to deny that of him. Surely his issue has to do with the fact that he is involved in a polemic with Plato and Socrates regarding the soul focus on the moral things. Not either skills or mud, so doubts Socrates. Not the human things or the surrounding thing do I wish to speak of, but the divine things alone. Does this not bring out the true ground of the ‘dispute’ with the dialecticians?

The Megarians are strange, what do they point to? The faithfulness, the gleam of fidelity in all acts? That they can only be effected when they are indeed affected and worked? There is something that makes one think of destiny. And therefore we think the Megarians are wiser, but they drift from the issue. Whereas in Aristotle it comes to a pinnacle. For he begins to ask about the causes (of course, not modern mechanical causes, far from it!) to such an extent that he overloads his students with matters meant for this purpose: to defend the school against false doctrine. For Aristotle sets this task: the means for securing the school, whereby the possibility of man as man can be carried on. This plan he lays down in the Nicomachean Ethics.

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Quote:
‘The beautiful is good’
Yes, I agree with what you say. Since that could only be asserted in metaphor. The good is higher than the kalon, which is mere good or sound glory. But there is some difficulty in speech here, if one is to be strict with the matter. A certain action might be kalon, but no action can be good simply. Thus, we come into difficulties. What is good can not be, for it is covered up by language. It is the aletheia. Where Heidegger became too daring was in saying that the Greeks were aware of this difficulty. They sensed it, but it was never taken up properly. Perhaps in this sensing they were somewhat closer than Heidegger himself could reach, for he and we are mislead by the symbolization of the entire work.

“‘A particular existing human being, is white.”
On a side issue, it has never been made clear to me. Does the white here refer to his toga or what? A white thing is seen in the distance. Then, one says, by power of accidental perception it is Socrates.

The white is a special perceptible (seen properly with the eyes themselves). Whereas the being of Socrates is an accidental predicable. Aristotle says the accidental is almost a lie. Socrates, the man from Alopeke. This is all a matter of thinking over the way perception works. Not some reversal.

You seem to be interjecting something like a medieval ‘object’ into the Greek world. It’s not that Aristotle says, there is a white thing, and I am bringing the character of that thing to that thing. He just describes the act of looking. It goes without saying that the thing is, in its essence, whatever it is. Since Descartes that way of looking has become utterly alien to us. So we have a difficulty in noticing what goes without saying in the Greeks.
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PostPosted: Mon Feb 29, 2016 11:40 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Addendum, citations which inevitably must lead to your improvement:

Here you can see that Aristotle treats the predication scheme indifferently:

Quote:
"the cultured person is a man" or "the white is cultured" or "the cultured is white,"
etc. see bellow [what matters is the primary substance, i.e., ‘this one’ and you point, as I have often, without hope of being heard, told you, as plainly as can be imagined possible. Yet your ignorance is omniscient, knowing in every place its stupidity, and omnipotent, un-overthrowable.]

Quote:
“"Being" [οὕτω] means (1.) accidental being, (2.) absolute being. (1.) E.g., we say that the upright person "is" cultured, and that the man "is" cultured, and that the cultured person "is" a man; very much as we say that the cultured person builds, because the builder happens to be cultured, or the cultured person a builder; for in this sense "X is Y" means that Y is an accident of X.And so it is with the examples cited above; for when we say that "the man is cultured" and "the cultured person is a man" or "the white is cultured" or "the cultured is white," in the last two cases it is because both predicates are accidental to the same subject, and in the first case because the predicate is accidental to what is ; and we say that "the cultured is a man" because "the cultured" is accidental to a man. (Similarly "not-white" is said to "be," because the subject of which "not-white" is an accident, is .) [20] These, then, are the senses in which things are said to "be" accidentally: either because both predicates belong to the same subject, which is ; or because the predicate belongs to the subject, which is ; or because the subject to which belongs that of which it is itself predicated itself is .”


http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1017a

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Yet, when you see Plato say the reverse of what you hold that he says, you do not apply your idiocy to him, as you do with Aristotle. What forcible and idiotic profiling is at work in you?:

Quote:
“For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason”
Socrates in the Phaedrus

Quote:
For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity [249c] by means of reason (logos, λογισμοί) the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being.


http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0174%3Atext%3DPhaedrus%3Apage%3D249

Quote:
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶνἰὸν αἰσθήσεων [249ξ] εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ….


Recast for usage:
Quote:
Anthropos must have the eidos and speak it…
Yes? He must see it! What else does eidos mean. He must speak it. Why? This is how we predicate. That one is like this. Look at that white stuff, it is big. That big thing is a strong green colour. That big thing is a Cypress. The Cypress stands there imposingly. The car stands there on the street. Logical premising.

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After considering it, I have come to see your mistake lies in taking the fact that Aristotle adds to the school, of his teacher Plato, a treatment of the particular according to the Pythagorean elemental analysis, for a foundation change. You take an addition for a reversal of standpoint.

Aristotle is the student of Plato. Whereas the Megarians stem from Socrates. Which is a point worthy of bringing to one’s intelligence. The contrast is of some importance and usefulness to one’s thinking.
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PostPosted: Wed Mar 02, 2016 11:58 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
"the cultured person is a man" or "the white is cultured" or "the cultured is white,"


This is dunce level Aristotle. If you think that I don’t grasp this, why are you bothering to answer. I wouldn’t.

What we are talking about is whether this is the way Plato sees it. - a far more subtle point. Because if it isn’t, then my point, or to be perfectly honest, J. W. McGinley’s, is that the selected passage from Theta Nine is a slander against Plato’s Theory of Forms.

You accuse me of not listening, yet this last mail of yours finds you struggling to grasp the simple points that I’m trialing on McGinley’s behalf. He puts his own thesis forward in The Dreadful Symmetry of the Good. I don’t know the author and have many disagreements with him (he like Heidegger is no Pythagorean; he also is averse to Timaeus).

Nevertheless I do chime with him on this present topic. I want you to put up a strong argument (without the Turetz stuff, if possible) so we can find out if McGinley’s bell (and mine) is not cracked.

I want to present his case in a reasonable way, but you refuse to accept even the obvious points. They concern the status of Universals (kathalou) – are they representative of the Platonic eide? If they are not then Aristotle’s representation of in Theta Nine as potentialities is simply a slander.

My own point here you completely didn’t get, did you? You read in the Seventh Letter that the fourth degree of any object is knowledge, and you immediately come to the conclusion that Knowledge itself cannot be a Form. This as my quote from Theaetetus should have explained, is knowledge of. Do you really think Plato is saying that every other ENtity in the whole of existence works like the circle except knowledge; that knowledge is ‘lower’ than all natural bodies, less privileged than a petrol pump? Perhaps he should have composed a Dialogue hunting down the true meaning of “petrol pump”.

What is being said by McGinley is that this whole method of predication (a Latin term for catagorize) was never the Platonic way. Sharing and blending of real wholes, individuals and eidoi, is different to predication simply because the individual sharer ‘is taken upwards’ to the Form. The universals are of course reliant upon (praedicated of) the ‘prior’ existence of the primary being as your quote shows. There is much more to this, but thus far is clear is it not? If not, please tell where I am erring.

Your quote from Phaedrus shows Socrates describing the fallen souls ‘remembering’ by means of learning the first steps of dialectic collection and division. The final step is apprehension of the Form. I don’t know where universal crept in, but it doesn’t belong there. It's not the word universal or even kata - holou but the use Aristotle put it to

Quote:
After considering it, I have come to see your mistake lies in taking the fact that Aristotle adds to the school, of his teacher Plato, a treatment of the particular according to the Pythagorean elemental analysis, for a foundation change. You take an addition for a reversal of standpoint.


Well he certainly reverses the fundamental thesis that the soul is immortal. If that’s not a turn around at the heart of Plato’s philosophy I don’t know what is. An immortal soul just would not work with the concept of universals, or perhaps you could show how it would.

Well, O Third Man, are you travelling towards me, or me towards you? Or are we both trapped in our own idiocy?
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PostPosted: Wed Mar 02, 2016 4:37 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Of far more genuine interest to me is this Megarian issue you talk of, which is also the subject of Theta 3. My take may be different to yours here, but I do not see this as unconnected to the notion we have of knowledge. I do not know what a Megarian would think of techne. Is the ability to build sitting with the builder in the tavern while on his lunch break?

Quote:
We must see him do it! We all know that a man who can make shoes, might be drunk. He might be sick. He might have a spasm in his hand even at the moment when his materials lie waiting before him to be worked. I ask you this, is Aristotle headless when he says, this man has the skill simply? He has it or doesn't?


Thrasymachus, the sophist, separates the skill from the possessor of the skill:

"do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,1 no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred." [Republic 340d]

I believe you when you talk of the eidosof shoemaking. I believe that the man whose we call a craftsman 'has' and 'possesses' his skill even when not demonstrating it. The Megarians are reputed to have originated from Socrates but have more than a touch of Protagoras about them faithful as they are to the senses. They would insist that possessing was demonstrating.

But let us consider this shoemaker chap, who, though he may frequent the tavern too frequently and consequently sew his thumb to the leather occasionally, has no real problem in making a pair of shoes on commission. No one doubts that he 'has' (hexis) this knowledge (which I say is of the fourth degree - being knowledge 'of') and but for those moments where he slips, he also possesses (ktaomai) the same.

The middle voice says it all, that he is able to procure it for himself when needed from what has become a habit of the mind, or whatever you wish to call it. The Megarian seems to only acknowledge the procuring of the knowledge in the form of the energeia and I think that Aristotle counters this argument adequately. But if it is our intention to extend this situation to 'knowledge itself' (which I do consider to be the Platonic eidos) problems immediately begin to appear:

"Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?" Theaetetus 198c

You know as well as I how this passage ends, and how 'slippage' occurs.

I draw your attention to the fact that in the case of 'knowledge of' the professional has a quick and easy route from 'having' to 'possessing' but regarding pure knowledge in itself, the access route is by no means straight forward as Plato testifies to in the Seventh Letter:

"There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden,1 as light that is kindled" [341c]

One wonders how the Megarians would have treated Socrates 'speaking' - whether they would consider this to be a perfect example of potential/actual, possession/having. Or there again, would Aristotle consider that Socrates possessed this knowledge even though Socrates had already interpreted the Delphic oracle as saying that the only wisdom he 'had' was that he knew he 'possessed' no wisdom.
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PostPosted: Wed Mar 02, 2016 11:51 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Reply to PART 1


“This is dunce level Aristotle.”

Any serious student must start here. And try to keep here if possible. Your ‘advanced’ level is empty gabble and a dodge. You can’t even understand the simple formalism: individual (or whatever term one likes), particular (or whatever term one likes), universal (or whatever term on likes)? If one can’t get that far the rest is necessarily silly. Today almost everything produced by academics is an extension of such silliness, but that should not be taken as a cover-all excuse.

“McGinley’s bell (and mine) is not cracked”

You're both, ostensibly, brainless nitwits, and so your nescience is not slayable. And you can not pick up anything plain and sensible. But are only impressed by authority, i.e., by complicated idiocies often repeated and widely held. The more broadly held the better.

“The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS, they are known to have a double effect.” Federalist Papers #49

Wisdom, do simple and true observations deserve that name, from a more thoughtful age.

One should start by asking what is at question here. How is it that one knows that a book is a book? One sees a book, a volume that one has never encountered, and says at once, “It is a book.” How is it possible? Does it not imply that one was already pregnant? One has had no experience with that book there, but knows that it is a book at once. One sees the red of the cover, of that book there, the one that one only now stumbles on, but red does not speak of the essence of all books. All red things are not books. There are books that are turquoise. If books are always things that contain written or printed pages, a stone is no book. How do I know? Because I consult a definition?

Now, one should start with such simple descriptions and questions. I.e., with a thoroughgoing familiarity with the region in which these questions obtain their various determinations for thought. Otherwise only nonsense follows with people who have long been thinking ‘deeply’ over ‘advanced’ points.


Quote:
“I want to present his case in a reasonable way, but you refuse to accept even the obvious points. They concern the status of Universals (kathalou) – are they representative of the Platonic eide?”


Where does the word occur in Aristotle? Provide the passage. We have before us a passage where Socrates speaks of the eidos in connection with the senses. Aristotle says the eidos or universal or concept (taken as interchangeable synonyms) is from so-called accidental perception. Exactly the same as Plato, though slightly more detailed, in so far as Plato does not inspect perception with precision. Surely one could wonder if a mistake is made in the application of any precision, as something might in that way be shunted out or obscured. Yet, there is nothing like the alleged “reversal” in that.

The eidos. What does it say? At first it is only the answer to the question, how can this book, never before encountered, be at once conceived as a book? The eidos. So the eidos is something over and above the experience of the one there. It must be since I have never seen the one there. (Naturally, if this problem is taken up neurologically or physiologically (i.e., psychologically) we find ourselves determined in another way entirely! Thus, one must show why this procedure is justified at all, as anything but a poetic antiquarianism, but here we need not concern ourselves with that.)

Is some thing seen as a book? Or is the book seen as a book? That one, and you point, is a book? Or is the book part of the eidos book? Part of the class of all books. How does this structure present itself to Plato and Aristotle? This must be clarified. Does eidos say the look, i.e., the surface? And not the substance? Is the as structure the is structure? One must be very clear about everything at the outset. Otherwise this ‘advanced’ territory is drivel.

Quote:
“Do you really think Plato is saying that every other ENtity in the whole of existence works like the circle except knowledge”


Knowledge (episteme) is according to truth. I say, there is a circle, and if it is there I speak the truth. Whereas some thing, a circle, is known (intuited or experienced), presumably, by nous and pistis and the other ways the line metaphor allows.

Plato can not give the highest forms in the way he can deal with some object. With an outer look as an eidos. Truth has no outer look. Plato already deals with matter (sensorium-object) and form (the thing itself).

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Quote:
“What is being said by McGinley is that this whole method of predication (a Latin term for catagorize) was never the Platonic way.”


In the simplest sense predication says: I say something about something. I see a book, and then I say, it is crimson. Or I say, that book is standing on the teak shelf. What Aristotle does is allow this to become a premise, for the sake of logical discussion. Logos already means logic (the calculativeness of the dialectic proof, elenctic method) with Socrates. It is what he calls strictness. However, even the sophists use this stricture, for they are “domesticated”. Is it not all in Plato? What does McGinley say?

Predication is a matter of how speach operates. Speach is logos, logos is what is in accordance with truth. Truth, however, is no ordinary form, and has no eidos, no look. I mean no mirror can reflect it, as Socrates might have put it.

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Quote:

“Well he certainly reverses the fundamental thesis that the soul is immortal. If that’s not a turn around at the heart of Plato’s philosophy I don’t know what is. An immortal soul just would not work with the concept of universals, or perhaps you could show how it would.”


We would have to know what “concept of universals” is supposed to mean. For instance, in the above example about the episteme of shoemaking. Do you say that Aristotle believes that when no person currently alive knows how to make shoes, there is no such form, not in any way? That conclusion seems to violate commons sense. And so I conclude it would be impossible to consider Aristotle so stupid, at least without serious explanation.
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PostPosted: Thu Mar 03, 2016 12:55 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Response Part 2:

Quote:
"There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden,1 as light that is kindled" [341c]


Yes, but then at once he says what is kindled is the circle itself. The fifth thing. That is the circle itself. Not episteme itself, nor truth itself. Surely it is very plain that the fifth is not episteme, for Plato says, of all of these, it is most like episteme.

This fifth shows how the circle is in so many places at once. The seen thing and the name, the knowledge and the definition. It is what Heidegger calls, neatly, the simple unity of the four. In fact it points to the eternal being of the circle. A circle is thus itself, and not something in contrast with other things. What is learned here is quite simple and noble. Yet, Plato does not go so far as to look into his, one can say by inference, categories. The True, the Kalon, and the Good.

Of the Megarians and Pistis:

The senses are a strange measure. They surely do not mean “natural science”. There is a giving witness, but to what one can not say. There is mystery. Even if one described everything one saw, with mathamatical precision, this formalism would only be a screen. Which any fool would soon put aside, so as to glance directly into the mystery. There is something wise in the Megarians. Surely it is the fool who ventures to say what he does not know. And they stay silent about that. Yet, why does reaching towards knowledge seem to stimulate a deeper look into the mystery? As if the blurry eyes of the knower were more suited to a renewed wakefulness.
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PostPosted: Thu Mar 03, 2016 2:42 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
Yes, but then at once he says what is kindled is the circle itself. The fifth thing. That is the circle itself. Not episteme itself, nor truth itself. Surely it is very plain that the fifth is not episteme, for Plato says, of all of these, it is most like episteme.


In no way can we write down directly what this fifth thing is, except in terms of the previous four – which is the difficulty, as they are, Plato says, steeped in limitation. In the case of that thing which we do not know, but has the name kuklos or ‘circle’, Plato is asking us to ‘conceive’ of it without any straightness even though we habitually think of this fifth thing and wonder why a straight line cannot be constructed that touches it tangentially as if it were a bronze sphere. Ordinary dianoia cannot see the impossibility, for it is not yet ‘sharing’, at that moment, in reason, merely logic or whatever.

That’s seems to be what Plato is telling us, but Socrates might say:

Look, if someone were to ask you what ‘definition’ was would you answer “that which is everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the centre”? Then if this person was asked by another the definition of a triangle, he would be compelled to say “that which is everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the centre”. We laugh at such an absurdity. But if we are asked “What is knowing?” would it not be as absurd to say “It pertains to a circle”? The kind of knowledge spoken of here is qualified by the ‘of’; in other words it is applied knowledge.

What I am saying here in no way contradicts the text of the Seventh Letter as far as I can see. The thing itself is always the fifth thing. And the knowledge of that thing is always the fourth thing. But this knowledge is never itself , in the event, pure knowledge but applied knowledge.

What a wondrous thing is this knowledge that when applied to any thing that is, whether it be the straight, or of the spherical form, or colour, or of the good, the fair, the just, of all bodies whether manufactured or naturally produced (such as fire and water and all such substances), of all living creatures, or of all moral actions or passions in souls, it always transports us to the very edge of understanding that thing!

But perhaps you think there is no such thing as knowledge in itself.
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PostPosted: Fri Mar 04, 2016 11:46 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

It seems to me that what you are saying is that the thing peculiar to the circle, the essence, is the same as the circle that has no contact with the straight line. Because the circle itself is not contrasted with something else. It is not curve defined by a contrast with straight. But curve itself. That is surely the circle itself. It is not episteme itself. Episteme refers to the fact that someone knows what to do there. In the organic sense, not because they have a scientific rule which has been put into words. For the Greeks there is no applied science. There is theoria, as orientation, and there is praxis, as the care of the one who works effects that are specific to his or her art.

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Does episteme mean almost the same thing as techne? Is it not the knowledge of an art, shoemaking, the educator’s art, the statesman's art. It is practical knowledge. This knowledge is a synonym for experience. Experience in the sense of knowing. I.e.: Does he know by experience or being told by someone he trusts? In the latter case that is opinion. There is no “applied” opinion nor applied episteme. What one applies is a true law. The Greeks do not deal with applied knowledge in any way. [Naturally, one can always use that word and be understood colloquially.]

Truth is the measure of logos, i.e., of speech. The fifth thing is not experience, i.e., it is not learned by our dealing amidst the things that change, or the beings as a whole taken as physis. And it is also not truth, because it is not learned by discussion even if discussion may stimulate it. It is not laid out in logos. The glimpse of it might be given another name with respect to the faculty that apprehends it.

Is it not that what you say with respect to the “absurdity” of definition also goes for experience? Since in experience the circle is always part of a contrast. And not the circle itself.

So since it is neither a matter of experience nor of intelligence, it is a noble mystery. That of the being of the circle. If we come this far do we not see Heidegger’s point. It is not asked, what is this being itself. Plato sees the being of beings, as they are, but not being.

The being of a being is there for reflection. Reflection so conceived is the possibility of the gods. Plato understands man as being partly divine. But we are rooted in the life of the Polis and that of physis. So Aristotle takes great pains to secure the possibility of the reflection. Reflection is not knowledge. It is something higher by far. Naturally one might always call it knowledge itself and not be wrong, but strictly speaking if we want to speak about episteme that would be misleading. It is not episteme itself. Episteme is a mortal possession, much like techne.

I appreciate the sense of what you say but it can’t be right. Episteme itself would have no object. Just as the circle itself is only the circle. It would be the being of episteme. In a sense Plato includes it when he says take the circle to be a case like all the others. Perhaps one can also include the being of truth and the being of the kalon and the good. I am not certain since that is merely a schematic proof and it must be grasped more carefully.


Addendum:

Your way seems suspiciously like the way of those who say Plato hypostatized the concept. That is a very old and false opinion which one is somehow always likely to take up. It merges the gods with the mortals in an impossible way.



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For any occasional reader I include an article known to the forum, generally speaking: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/episteme-techne/
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PostPosted: Wed Mar 09, 2016 6:36 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Addendum: autos episteme: If it means episteme itself, then that is knowledge simple, unqualified knowledge (trivially, it is obscured by the translators's rather senseless choice of the word 'absolute' with its fantastical connotative implications [Translators, by in large, have no serious knowledge of philosophy, and even when they do, as often again, they have no talent in philosophy, and so they are the disasters attached to poorly-guided text books]). However, must we not consider the nature of knowledge? Does it exist without the human soul? It is part of the human soul, so I say, self knowledge. The knowledge of a self, that of a soul. Is the knowledge the same as what is known? I say even if the soul is eternal, and the knowledge of the soul is likewise eternal, the thing it knows, e.g., the circle itself, has its own being. And also, I contend, Aristotle must, if he is not to be considered wholly stupid, have been aware of that. Thus, why does he not mention the material named in the letter? It can only be because it is an initiate's knowledge, as Plato himself tells us in the letter.

If it were not so the matters would have been dealt with more explicitly in the Metaphysics. A written document was not appropriate for that.

More precisely, one, I believe, must say that the circle as the fifth thing, is no knowledge (episteme) at all. It is not even grasped by the soul. But only, like a fire, does the specter of the divination rush over the being of the self, blowing the self away. So that the sense that it must be like that with the fifth thing takes its place.

One can ask it this way, does Plato speak at all about something like participation (the matter explicitly censured by Aristotle in the text we have been discussing) in the letter? Not at all. That is a subject of his public discourse. Which itself is a catalog of the breadth of all possible standpoints or doctrines and never Plato’s doctrine. Plato makes no bounded determination about the being of the fifth thing in the letter. For it is a noble mystery, divined, alone, by the supreme few.

Now, being relieved of these difficulties, I shall make ready to continue with the primary issue. Which, however, perhaps must be clarified in the light of this peculiar path to being. Which is itself a drilling back down to being form Plato’s catalog, as it were, and not an genetic view of being out of the basic phenomena.
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PostPosted: Thu Mar 17, 2016 1:06 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Contributions pertaining to the “as” and “is” under the Kantian conception and rule:

“He [Kant] argued that "existing" adds nothing (including perfection) to the essence of a being, and thus a "supremely perfect" being can be conceived not to exist. Finally, philosophers including C. D. Broad dismissed the coherence of a maximally great being, proposing that some attributes of greatness are incompatible with others, rendering "maximally great being" incoherent.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

The article says that "existing", i.e., being "adds nothing". (Note that the being of something is not the being of being, the being of something is existence.)

It should read: being can not be deduced logically.

The statement is a representation. Representations do not guarantee the existence of the things they are meant to represent.

Kant separates the as and the is. Predication/As: god is maximally great (god as the maximally great). (Verb/being)Is: God exists.

The exists adds nothing to the assertion. “God” already says, “god exists”. “Book” says the same as “book exists”. Book says book exists but could be false. No book, may, in deed, be there.

Heidegger says: Husserl was the one who put philosophy on a concrete basis.

But, does it mean that Husserl ended philosophy, so that Heidegger could begin to “think”? Surely not. Thinking means the flight from the limitation of representation. Representation in the sense of statements, and assertions which represent judgments. I see a book and I say that “there is a book there”. But since statements can never be avoided in philosophical work it is not the case that reason is abandoned. Rather it is abandoned as the highest measure.

What does something like ‘formal indication’ mean? It says that the statement points not to the truth, which is the rule that determines all statements in their logical exercise, but rather that it points to emotion. Thus the formal indication hopes to stimulate some sense of the matter under discussion through logos. Thus logos does not mean the specific Greek logic: i.e., judgment and statement, but here the logos as the written thing is a stimulus for feeling. Dostoevsky speaks of feeling an idea. The formal indication is not only a technical term, but it points to a typical experience. The representation of an idea is easily transmitted, but the idea is seldom felt. Thus whoever finds what the idea brings is so far from speaking when they feel it, that if they clumsily transcribe it, finding the language, they say at once the thing that is “old hat”.

But it is not any old “idea”, e.g., that of charisma as the gift which marks the receiver of divine things, or, that of Natural Rights, that deserve our “unconstrained favouring”, but those beings that are most essential. Space as distance achieves first and foremost the break from the self-absorbed nature of the infant and the toddler. The hostile and the pleasurable which make the human being first and foremost themselves, as the ones who must work effects that bring control and let one win a standing amidst the distance in which one moves.

It is this distance which can not properly be brought to representation in statement. It is pointed to only by formal indication. This being, that that is occluded by the name distance, the bellying out of the yawning space, is the being of an age grown into and actualizing of the being of praxis. For the being that has praxis.

What Husserl will not say is: this being was for the Greeks a Greek distance. This being was for the Greeks a Greek life, a Greek world. Husserl plainly refuses to relinquish the severity of the phenomenological practise, in order to open the formal indication.

Firstly one should say that it is fatal if we start from the assumption that is today prominent: “Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.”

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

“First-person” can not mean the view of the “subject”. The subject only speaks of matters of interest. Of psychological matters. Husserl speaks in quotation marks of a “pure subject”. This is a concession he makes for the sake of something like a formal indication (since one can not represent this matter. Thus Heidegger says, following his master, and so showing the way to properly confront Husserl, to know the phenomenology of Husserl one must read Husserl. One should note that Heidegger does not say, to know the phenomenology of Hegel, one must read Hegel). When he speaks about the question of solipsism. Phenomenology departs from the subject, it is solipsistic and then it even dismisses the subject entirely for the ground of the being. It allows the thing brought to bring, and to come to us in its own way such that we play no role.

In listening, if there were anyone who could listen to a person in conversation, there is a going towards the thing said, not towards the things indicated or a picture of what is said. And if there were a supreme listener they would be ready to let the being of the thing said bring to them what belonged to it. Usually, of course, such listeners are lacking. For we all want, most of all, to bring something of our own to the thing said. And to direct the thing according to our dispositions and propensities.

“Consciousness” is not in question. Rather what Kant called existence is in question. The is. The thing that is brought so far as it appeals to the subject, as the thing that can come into my hands, and be part of my practice is not named. The thing that I may take up in the way I am so disposed to is not meant. Nothing usable is meant here. But the is is not logical because it is not a matter of the usable. It speaks of the essential nature that is brought as what first makes the usable through its own bestowal.

Heidegger calls consciousness thinking. But Heidegger includes also the topos and so the world in this concept. Topos, in Mycenaean Greece, said there sit the workmen, and there on the hill is the palace and those that belong to the palace. At first topos said as much “over there” as it indicated rank and stature. There was no space for the Mycenaeans, no more than the Hebrews had the word is did the Greeks have the word space.

Everything has a ranking in human life. This is because in destiny things must come to pass, whereas in science there is no necessity that anything that might will be. Science when it is popularized becomes testing. But what it is in its essence is knowledge. Knowledge, properly, is knowledge of what could be but need not be. That if I put so much explosive beside such and such a structure, it would or would not fall. And then perhaps probabilities. But with no reference to whether it will happen so. If I am to do the thing science knows, I apply my science. But in life something must happen. Thus destiny takes its character of unresetability. The world and being are no test.

Being here does not speak of being itself, but of the being of this and that however essential. The being of a world. In Heidegger there is a going beyond the thinking, of the actual. This Husserl calls the “naivete” of Heidegger (taken as a title of the work).
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PostPosted: Fri Mar 18, 2016 9:45 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I apologise for this delay. but although only a lonely rock'n'roller, it would be irrespnsible of me to leave matters in the scatty way you have left them. Here you say:

Quote:
It seems to me that what you are saying is that the thing peculiar to the circle, the essence, is the same as the circle that has no contact with the straight line. Because the circle itself is not contrasted with something else. It is not curve defined by a contrast with straight. But curve itself. That is surely the circle itself. It is not episteme itself. Episteme refers to the fact that someone knows what to do there. In the organic sense, not because they have a scientific rule which has been put into words. For the Greeks there is no applied science. There is theoria, as orientation, and there is praxis, as the care of the one who works effects that are specific to his or her art.

Most of what you say here is irrelevant to my points. What I am saying is simply following what Socrates stated in Theaetetus which I quoted in the post above and which I think is the premier saying of this. As this is simple stuff, I see no reason why you should make such a complicated thing of it. With regard to the circle, which, as Plato says in the 7th Letter, is just an example, knowledge of that example is one of the ways of coming upon that example. The other ways are by an account, by shape and by name. Each approach the entity in its own way, but none, as a form in itself, is limited by that entity, whatever it may be. I.e. 'Knowledge itself' is not limited to or by 'knowledge-of-a-circle'. Shape (morphe) is not itself limited by the circle's roundness, and so on. It also goes to say that whatever the entity is, it itself, as fifth, cannot be limited by the four forms of enquiry of that entity. Plato says that quite clearly. One only has to contemplate this (theorein) to see its Beauty. Nothing ultimately is limited by anything else, hence the integrity (wholeness) of the 'world of Forms'. They either blend or do not blend.

Indeed, each may itself be number five, because Plato has made it clear that the fifth as eidos (though he doesn’t actually say eidos) can be anything - he gives a compressive list. There are as many eide as there are entities types (cf. The Parmenides 130b-130e) or do we bar only Knowledge–itself from that non-exclusive club. I suggest you reread the passage from Theaetetus that I quoted earlier and tell me what you think it means. To save you hunting back I reintroduce the passage again here:

Theaetetus
Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

Socrates
You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

Theaetetus
What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates
Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say “cobblery” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

Theaetetus
Nothing else.

Socrates
And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

Theaetetus
Nothing else by that, either.

Socrates
Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

Theaetetus
Yes.

Socrates
But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

Theaetetus
Nay, you are quite right.

[THEAETETUS 146C]


But,again as I pointed out, you can save yourself the task by simple taking account of what Plato says himself in the Letter, which I again display:

knowledge and intelligence and true opinion regarding these objects

Note the two highlighted sections.

I would also recommend that you go back to the reason why we explored this passage from the Seventh Letter. Perhaps you have lost yourself in your own arguments.


---------------------------------------------------------------------


On a different tack, I would also, as moderator, like to ask you to keep the content of your posts relatable to Platonic concerns. That means, in the context of your latest posts, not to simply wade in as if in the middle of a seminar, assuming all to understand what is prior, but, for example, to point out how phenomenology evolved from some Greek model (I know Heidegger saw phenomenological concerns in Aristotle, but you clearly don't think that readers are entitled to such basic information. Would you, for example, like me to interrogate you from a beginner's standpoint? Otherwise I suggest you post to the Modern Western Philosophy, or some other forum which has the right character for such conversations. It clearly is obfuscating the character of this forum.

Thank you.
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PostPosted: Fri Mar 18, 2016 9:07 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

You seem to grant what I said, that the circle itself (the eidos [if we may take the liberty to name it so] of the circle as understood in the letter) is not episteme itself (experiential-knowledge itself), in a tone that implies disagreement. Although, earlier you were contending that the fifth was knowledge (episteme) itself. (Of course, there is a semantic issue here, and it is somewhat harry or bothersome.)

Quote:
“Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.”


What does knowledge (episteme) mean here? Does it not mean experience, i.e., knowledge from pistis? It means: Practical knowledge, in opposition to what Socrates seeks, theoretical truth. From looking at the things that stand there, and not their reflections in water, I come to know them. This is epistme and techne (there is a somewhat difficult distinction, but we don't need that here, because it is helpful here to make the connection with something we all know, craft, handicraft, artistic achievement, and the making of anything that involves knowledge of things we come across and are exposed to in our dealing on the earth.)

The fifth thing names neither truth nor episteme, it names the being.

Quote:
“But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?”


That is just a question. No sufficient answer is given. In a way, epistem itself, is what Heidegger asks about in his essays on thinking. But that requires severe clarifications, I mean one needs to go along looking at the sap in each tree, or the maple syrup; whereas here Socrates simply names that forest, episteme itself. Plato nowhere goes beyond naming it.

--

If you suppress the content of my posts I will cease posting here. If people don’t understand what is said they should say where they are lost. And not make vague comments about sophistry, disconnection from Plato, or other such nonsense. Of course, one must always “interrogate from a beginner's standpoint”, since we must perform our beginnerhood anew each time we broach a topic (least we become lost like people who do "theory", [which today is called "continental philosophy" "critical theory" and a thousand and one such imbecility] of course without being able to ever demonstrate to themselves or anyone else the necessity of it, or why the old ways were abandoned, I mean except with little catchphrases that are never seriously understood, by silly professors, who themselves are nothing but embodied pomposity connected to talking nonsense with no end). However, surely one can not expect to say about something, the whole explanation, out of the things that are most clear, every time we write. Such that, at great length, we come to the really-vexing obscurities by real force. That would make the work needlessly prolix and tedious.
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PostPosted: Mon Mar 21, 2016 2:59 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

I suppose I shouldn’t like this discussion to go on and on, yet neither would I want it to end without giving an accurate an account of what I actually said in my previous posts. After that I would just as well leave it altogether and let my own words speak for themselves. Certainly I have not done a ‘turnabout’ in any way.

Let’s try to untangle this sorry state of affairs.

You say:

Quote:
<<The fifth thing. That is the circle itself. Not episteme itself, nor truth itself. Surely it is very plain that the fifth is not episteme, for Plato says, of all of these, it is most like episteme.>>


Of course the fifth thing is not, in this case, knowledge (episteme) itself. We have already been told that by Plato:

“If you wish, then, to understand what I am now saying, take a single example and learn from it what applies to all. There is an object called a circle…” Seventh Letter 342b

Yes, as you say, the fifth is the circle itself, the eidos, but only in this case. It is an example, yes? What is not an example are the four things said of this or any example, i.e. name 'of', definition 'of', shape 'of', knowledge 'of'.

You cannot think that I mean that the 'circle itself' is 'knowledge itself'. I haven’t said that. Yet, as is shown, knowledge plays a role here, as the fourth. But this is not pure knowledge, for the Letter says:

““Fourth comes knowledge and intelligence and true opinion regarding these objects”[342c]”

But the particular ‘knowledge regarding’ will be different in every application. This brings us into exactly the same circular problem of ‘knowledge of’ which kicks off the search in Theaetetus. It is quite straight forward, is it not, that what is not ‘knowledge of’ is 'knowledge in itself,’ which, like the circle ‘in itself’ stands at number 5, the position of eidos?


Is there any easier way of saying this?

Regarding the circle in itself (not knowledge in itself!) :

<<In no way can we write down directly what this fifth thing is except in terms of the previous four [see Plato’s Seventh Letter – 342a] – which is the difficulty, as they are, Plato says, steeped in limitation (defective [343d]). In the case of that thing which we do not know, but has the name kuklos or ‘circle’, Plato is asking us to ‘conceive’ of it without any straightness even though we habitually think of this fifth thing and wonder why a straight line cannot be constructed that touches it tangentially as if it were a bronze sphere.>>

Here I try to talk of the fifth, in the form of the circle, kuklos, without overly emphasizing ‘name’, nor ‘definition’ – that is, I try to convey why such an eidos differs from some old a circle ‘turned on the lathe’. It simply cannot be conceived in this tangential way. The lathe provides the ‘straight edge’ needed to produce a tangent and this causes a kind of ‘roundness’.

This is the way, as you may know, that Archimedes conceived a method of fine approximation (via the use of continuing fractions) of calculating the circumference in terms of the circle’s radius. His circle is in fact a polygon with an infinite number of sides, each potentially generating a tangent. The true Form of the circle, has no truck with infinity, it is the epitome of roundness closing off into eternity in one perfectly conceived curved line that could not occur in any crafted circle.

Yes, this is not ‘knowledge-itself’ but is in fact ‘circle-itself’. When did I say it wasn’t? This circle-itself is easily brought before the mind for contemplation when the geometrician stands in front of the sand pit or whiteboard and draws casually saying, “Let this be a perfect circle”. And it is - not in execution but in thought.

That, O Third Man, is the first half of our problem. Not much point going on to the second until we can reach some sort of agreement here.

..................................................
As to you last bit, can you say what, in simple phenomenological terms, can be said about a simple appearance such as, say, a cup. What would be Husserl's approach to such an object. We could then perhaps make a comparison with how, for example, Aristotle would approach the same object. In other words how that cup would stand with regards being in the two different viewings? Can 'being' be a bridge between the two. I am not at this stage interested in Heidegger's phenomenology, which I gather is somewhat different. That may be for later discussion.
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PostPosted: Mon Mar 21, 2016 10:45 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

"The essence was unutterably trashy and banal." ~ Carl Jung of Heidegger (taken as a title of the work.)

Heidegger, he who keeps to the thinking of the times! Never was there so much discipline to be found in a philosopher, no wonder he was accused of mysticism. The clamp being so tight, and the tension so great.

Quote:
“But the particular ‘knowledge regarding’ will be different in every application. This brings us into exactly the same circular problem of ‘knowledge of’ which kicks off the search in Theaetetus. It is quite straight forward, is it not, that what is not ‘knowledge of’ is 'knowledge in itself,’ which, like the circle ‘in itself’ stands at number 5, the position of eidos?”


Certainly the movement between the aim, geist, and the accident, the thing grasped, leib, is in play here. The thing aimed at is psychological. It is essential and whole in its peculiarity. The things it comes across are fateful and may not continue, always, to be what the aiming wishes it to be. For the thing blooms and decays. But, the episteme, is the essence. It wants the things to obey it. It brings an established demand to the things. Yes, this is indeed what Heidegger (one must mention Heidegger at this moment!) examines under the name of thinking. For what is open is open under a specific eye (that of the Greeks, of the Western Moderns, of the Pharaonic Egyptians). One eye is disposed to grasp the fires along the plane surface of the vault. And there its disposition to know ends. Another always drifts further into the bottomless depths. There is more than one episteme. But the beings are not subject to this multiplicity of a thousand and one glance.

Quote:
“In no way can we write down directly what this fifth thing is except in terms of the previous four –”


This is why thinking is insufficient to the task. Yet, it permeates us. One might become more, I will put it this way, intelligent. We do not know that. This is why one is driven to look.

I believe Archimedes does not so much approach the circle itself as the truth of the circle. The statements of the circle in clear geometric terms come towards the law that is alone capable of determining the rightness of the work of Archimedes. The way to the being is not like that. One must consider the divining, and so I speak of that bellow.

I believe the perfect is not the being. You, see, the discussion of the being is more slippery. If it were merely the circle more perfect than the ones here, we would already almost know it. We would only seek it in truth. This is an extremely common mistake of the professors, though, still in Leo Strauss' time, it was known to be erroneous.

--


The issue, though, it seems to me, is why does one claim Aristotle has mutilated Plato. You said his approach was
Quote:
“pseudos”.
I do not see what the issue is, as Aristotle speaks of episteme and not of the beings. In Plato episteme is left in ambiguity. But, in Aristotle, a wonderful non-theoretical description comes to give us an intensity of exactitude of which, if one may say so, exceeds Socrates in excellence. This is Aristotle’s finest excellence (to bring living exactitude to the for, and not definitional strictness). It is through going along this way that Heidegger convinced Husserl that Aristotle had already known the phenomenological.

Let me give this account, though we need not take it as the best, or even as one of the better ways to approach phenomenology:

Is it possible that what you had in mind, “Aristotle's reversal” (our earlier discussion on the powers or “capacities”), was this: that with the things that are skills, a phenomenological (rather than a hypothetical) determination is made. Namely that one practices shoemaking, as an apprentice, prior to acquiring the being. I believe that is what you had in mind. That is entirely a practical consideration. That of “becoming”. You must consider that Aristotle says of the natural things, the e.g., power of seeing, that the power is prior to the act. As I believe is patently obvious. Perhaps a stronger case is a stone, that which has the power of falling.

Now, the chief thing here is to keep this all explicitly in phenomenological terms. So that we allow Aristotle to say what he observes, with the greatest exactitude. In this he does not theorize, in any proper sense.

Socrates is not very clear about these issues. Does he not deny not only knowing if arete can be taught, but a fortiori (it is worth mentioning), he says, with his typical pique and bluff, I do not know even of what you speak, dear Meno? It is as though Socrates denied any intellectual familiarity with arete (or the supreme practical [bodily and not intellectual] excellence of man as man). He is only able to dimly divine it, in a way sufficient to speak of it.

Now, remembering this position of dimly grasping the word, can we not say there is something here bellow the dianoia, and far bellow noesis, but yet above the animal grunt? The animal grunt indicates pain or pleasure. But the word, what the sound of it evokes, in the mere sound, is something more than a grunt. It seems to bring out the peculiarity of the thing named. Phenomenology finds this an important determination for its investigations.

It is a contention: Not all speach is logos taken in the sense of judgment and assertion. This has to do, also, with the ‘formal indication’. In so far as we can come from the word to the peculiarity of the thing spoken without taking the thing up psychologically, which is to say, ethically (or normativly with respect to action). We take it up but not for the sake of bringing it into our control and with a view towards having dispositional power over the thing named. We do not consider how the thing sits in our cosmos or order, or ecology.

--

I believe all this that involves the contention of "pseudos" does not touch on the subject matter of the seventh letter. It has to do with episteme. Not the beings.

--

Quote:
“As to you last bit, can you say what, in simple phenomenological terms, can be said about a simple appearance such as, say, a cup. What would be Husserl's approach to such an object. We could then perhaps make a comparison with how, for example, Aristotle would approach the same object.”


We would have to apply the phenomenology, the “it is”, not “it appears so”, to the sound of the word. Perhaps in one of the dialogues, such as the Meno. That is the example I know well, but can you give us another case, beside from the Republic, where we have the famous denial of Socrates, with concern to his chief topic of inquiry. There is the dialogue on courage, that is possible. On the other hand this may not be the best way to start. Heidegger, in a celebrated and amusing sally, in fact more than once, treats boredom. But, perhaps, he does not go to the simple feeling that guides us in the saying simply, but strays too far into the observation of the essence and the external.

One must, perhaps, find a better road, but your question might as well bring us to think through the more mundane paths first.

It is always possible that Heidegger is too technical, unlike Socrates who has that blessing of, how should one say, “easy going” with the matter in hand?
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