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Situating the Heideggerian capitulation of Aletheia

 
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PostPosted: Fri Jan 15, 2016 11:55 pm    Post subject: Situating the Heideggerian capitulation of Aletheia Reply with quote

General outline of the question of truth as uncovering and oblivion. As the privative etymology (where the a- is taken as a privative prefix) which takes license with the word aletheia. The work of Heribert Boeder was, presumably, just the last straw which allowed Heidegger to admit that this usage was not known to the Greeks (nor was it present in the word, which was misinterpreted). The matter of this interpretation concerns the emergence of the concern with the hen out of the on, the one out of being. The interpretation was not unmotivated by the basic matters, but only wrong in its particularity. The mistake is not decisive, but incidental. The problem of the emergence of the one out of being remains evidently perplexing.

The question is not regarded as a debate, but instead it presupposes the possibility of insight. Insight is the discovery of the worthy (and even the absolutely worthy); of what is worth noticing. The principle is not taken haphazardly, but it arises under the inspection of the history of western philosophy, it is chosen because this standard was available at the beginning as it is now. The standard remains a genetic departure, a place from which an investigation into existence starts, but it is more probable than those standards which are historically shown to emerge and to go away. The standard of rational productivity for instance, of labour which brings value in the face of progress.

Is aletheia essentially a polemical term directed against the idea of truth as correct adequation of the thing seen and the thing said? Does it attempt to reduce truth as correctness to triviality, and to usurp its place?

What does truth say? That a statement corresponds to known knowledge. Whoever sees a house has reliable knowledge. Is there a house there? Yes. And how do you know? I see it. Pisits is the sphere of reliability, sight. Pistis stands under episteme, as what is known by sight but must be secured with words. Episteme secures truth. Thus, if through dialectic I secure a definition of a house, it is a dwelling for humans, and I proclaim, there is a house, because I see a house there, I speak what is true. Thus the thing said is corroborated by the thing there. This is truth as sound securing of knowledge. What truth as correctness says differs from this in that it appeals to the rationality of the one who confirms the adequation of the things stated and the thing seen. The statement must be formally valid in the form of a proposition, the proposition when spoken must name the thing or state of affairs. The rationality of the rational agent is in question. The one who says yes, it is correct, is presumed to have the ability to carry out the judgment unfailingly. This rationality is not clearly challenged or even seen under the Athenian and proto-Greek truth, truth as securing.

Here we have two closely agreeing principles of truth. Securing, as sound assurance. And corroboration of the formal proposition, as a kind of rational assurance. After Descartes a third and a fourth measure arise. Descartes already suggests an empty agent, as the disappearance of the rational judgment, which says: what the proposition gives is empty, though consciousness know it, what matters is the empirical standing. Does it work on test. This is already in Descartes, though it is not seen in the talk of mental substance. This is Descartes’ concern, tout court. This opens the door to the forgetfulness of the ground from which the judgment is made. No longer is it asked, is the agent making the judgment itself secure? Because no one thinks it is necessary to ask about that so long as the empirical thing, the data so observed, matches the empty proposition.

What follows is that truth is regard as value. How does it happen? For the reason that if the agent is regarded as a political agent, the one saying yes it is a house there, we begin to suspect that he may lie. Does he lie? No. He does not lie but he is biased, he knows nothing of truth, he is parochial. The confirmation of the statement and the thing becomes a dubious affair. Truth becomes a value.

Truth as unconcealment is supposed to not treat at all with the concern with words as opposed to the things seen. Thus its ground is altogether different than that of the other terms. If the word, house, itself discloses the external presence of the house, the house itself was not, however, created by the speach. The word house does not ask anyone to vouch for its adequation with the thing. The agent speaks the immediate essence so as to disclose the thing there. But the speach can never simply tell what is there, but it is always possible to say something else. The saying as such suggests to itself something there behind its own narration only when it becomes a matter of communicating with a view to securing a collective agreement. But so long as the matter of the speaking remains without the concern of securing the collective agreement, it tells what it can never finish telling simply.

The oblivion does not name a thing, as if behind the surface something more real were to be found. The disclosing does not name the dialectical aim of determining a thing for collective communication. So that it might be agreed upon by all discerning individuals, and granted freely.

Yet, an agent is involved in this research to the extent that the research is, as here, to be presented to a community. In this sense the agent is not rational, but it is the agent taken up by the bearing: insight that is worthy. This measure is not meant to settle disputes among political agents, but it secures the possibility of the bare intelligibility that precedes any possible new manner of being. Taken formally, emptily, the removal of the standard would lead to direct confrontation of existence beyond intelligibility. The genetic view says: all research is from a standpoint in being, it starts from the immediate intuition of the essence of the, e.g., house. It proceeds into the subject matter as a thing which is not eternally sound, but which is an essence taken as a standpoint for the fundamental research. Thus the research has a fundamental awareness of itself as speaking of what is worthy in the essences, as just these, as what one can not keep to.

The concept appeals to the on, to being, as prior to the concern with collective or political securing of the correct opinion about what is true. Prior to the theological political conception which is taken over from the thought about the one or hen. The concept is not arbitrarily grafted on the early and Athenian Greeks, but it is presented as a heightening of the awareness of the concerns which was not visible from within the original standpoint of the Greeks themselves. The particular fastening of the meaning onto the word aletheia is refuted and the position capitulated, but only with regard to the specific misapplication of a generally worthy and abiding and binding research. The playful use of the term itself is not excluded, as it may remain helpful.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Sat Jan 16, 2016 6:46 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

This is interesting. Can you say more about Boeder's research on aletheia?


Quote:
General outline of the question of truth as uncovering and oblivion. As the privative etymology (where the a- is taken as a privative prefix) which takes license with the word aletheia. The work of Heribert Boeder was, presumably, just the last straw which allowed Heidegger to admit that this usage was not known to the Greeks (nor was it present in the word, which was misinterpreted). The matter of this interpretation concerns the emergence of the concern with the hen out of the on, the one out of being. The interpretation was not unmotivated by the basic matters, but only wrong in its particularity. The mistake is not decisive, but incidental. The problem of the emergence of the one out of being remains evidently perplexing.


When did Heidegger admit to his misinterpresation or misrepresentation?
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Peter Blumsom



Joined: 09 Mar 2007
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Location: Wembley, London, UK

PostPosted: Sat Jan 16, 2016 9:46 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

More thoughts and comments on your post.
I don't know who was the first to describe the world of sense objects which surround us as pistis but it certainly appears in the Divided Line (Republic) and it is from that view that I wish to discuss it. I've always sensed a bit of Socratic irony here for pistis or 'trust' is sandwiched between the Forms above, of which the world of objects and his wife are but imitations, and the shadowy realm of eikeisia below (can one really call it a world?). The objects of this nether region are but imitations of imitations. Both the realms of objects and their shadows/reflections are firmly ensconced under the generic term doxa - opinion/belief. Where is 'truth' to be found here (in Platonic rather than Heideggerian terms)? Remember, Plato's doctrine of Forms - or 'looks' - is radically different to the opposing notions of Antiphon and Aristotle, offering a transcending view of both Form and Soul. I would be interested in some 'Third Man' insights on this, O voyager in the Platonic realm.

Technically the term pistis is designated for the subjective appraisal, the 'what we see' as opposed to objective realm of horaton - the 'visible realm', for the Divided line is also vertically divided into subject and object. I hasten to add that this has no bearing on what you are saying. I also acknowledge that when pistis is fully cognised through dianoia under noesis it is a different animal indeed. But that's the problem that Plato poses for us, isn't it?
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PostPosted: Tue Jan 19, 2016 8:51 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

The admission is here, go to page 71 and scroll up to the words, “does not mean”:

https://books.google.com/books?id=mr_U4MOjJuYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=on+time+and+being&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXiYff2LbKAhUCKWMKHQ_zAvsQ6wEIJzAA#v=onepage&q=does%20not%20mean&f=false

Boeder’s work had to do with what Heidegger therein mentions, namely Homer, and other early Greek sources.



I believe pistis is not ironic, but it shows Plato’s closeness to the devenire, to the divining of the simple essences. Being, for Heidegger, can only be approached through the activation of the emotions (the inclusion, but not the overdetermination by, mort, death) , whereas higher reflection gains certainty as it abandons the ground of being. For Plato the ground is almost pure emotion, but he does not deny anything, rather he shows the entirety of what is. The emotions are obscuring, not ambiguous, but rather uncertain. Perhaps, somewhat like the errant cause.


“Technically the term pistis is designated for the subjective appraisal, the 'what we see' as opposed to objective realm of horaton - the 'visible realm'”


This is of absolute relevance. When Heidegger speaks of “everydayness” (natural life) he speaks of pistis, not of that abstracted pure intuition. The determinate realm of experienceable events, those that protrude into notice, is connected to the concept of consciousness, as pure experience, which is what Heidegger repudiates (in so far as it is made into a chief ground of an inquiry into being).

For example, one sees the red glow of a Christmas light quite naturally, but only rarely does something like, the ‘redness of red’, stand out for natural dasein.
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