|Posted: Fri Nov 20, 2015 11:01 pm Post subject: A Small Reflection on theHistorial Elimination of Philosophy
|A Small Reflection on the Historial Elimination of Philosophy
In the course of the elimination of all things, philosophy too understands itself according to the universal, which is at once deceptive and instructive, according to its mystery.
In order to characterize the unique we speak about the essence, but the essence is taken in the light of the accidental. In order that reality should tell us what we want to know, it should have to be grasped without accident. The essential peculiarity of reality would have to be taken up without being taken up. It is said that in Japan, even up until the time of the war, and until the book on culture written by the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict became well known, the alien notion of culture did not yet have a reality. The Japanese were still really Japanese, and not measured by their difference amidst the plethoric variety of cultures. Thus at a certain moment there ceased to be Japanese at all. In Germany, culture, not Kultur, i.e., culture in the American sense, began to seep into learned discussions. This too was from the American articulation, though this does not tell us at all that the ‘genius’ Benedict created or discovered the matter. The reverse would be closer to the truth.
Even more and more culture became its radically strange essence. At first it was still related to cultivation, to a striving, unconscious or not, towards a higher state (i.e., the notion still known to Spengler). It was cultivation, and could be understood according to the argument by analogy with the notion of agriculture. Something that moves from a rude state to a high or developed state. At all times it was known that there were different ways of thinking, but never was man in his essence obliterated until the dawn of culture, as the ‘anything goes.’ A civilization is still understood according to the fixed forms which define its constructive basis, in the categories of laws, literacy, agriculture, family structure, history and so forth. But when culture is plausibly, and most of all, practically, a sheer matter of variety, the universal, the term as what speaks to the older thought, ceases.
Because a matter can not be understood without some distance human beings were defined in the light of the animal. Human beings blush, are embarrassed by their nudity, in contradistinction, to animals. But this blushing seems to leave something unsaid when it is understood by comparison with something outside itself. Human beings, it is said, speak, in contradistinction to animals. If we try to understand speech, we explain to ourselves a variety of things humans do with speech that animals don’t do, without ever completing this list. The essence of speech itself never brings us to speech, but it always shows us speech as it stands in the light of what is not speech.
If we ask about philosophy, about its essence, what we discover is that it is a form of teaching, it is a teaching that concerns a sense of knowing how to guide oneself towards a vague category, called, ‘what matters most.’ Because this present darkness, the knowing how to go towards the thing that is and is not here, is not laid down like a law, but only grasped through the knowledge of philosophy, of its essence, if it slips away, it will not be noticed. It can only be inferred so long as something almost like it continues to be known, then it is still noticed. But after enough time passes, and nobody anymore is trained to this knowledge, it will be utterly forgotten.
An inchoate and crude word on the human approaches to reality according to the genetic always-uptaking of all issues at 'any old time' or position in knowing:
When there are words, there are numbers. Numbers are at first words. When the Pythagoreans define words over and against things that one can see, we begin to approach the essence of math. If there were not geometry, the visual key of the older mathamatics, math would not be worth doing for them, most of all as themselves (biographically). Pure math is defined over and against space, but within the inner man, math has its ground and so does language. Plato knew this, and was, of course, not a Pythagorean. One must understand that Plato was someone who showed everything that could be shown, in order to give the entirety. Aristotle, when he named Plato an epigone of the Pythagoreans and the rest, had this most of all in mind. That he was a receptacle of the ancients. Plato shows us most of all that the word and the number can be drawn up. On the one side with the senses, on the other with the emotions. However we ourselves only have sense experience, and only have emotional lives like we have things and passing thoughts. The ground of ourselves forms, and the thing it is based on remains only intuited. The remembrance of what is partly known is the experience of the senses, wherein only the partial or the essence appears. It is strange, then, that the essence is rewritten as the partial, and not as what is most peculiar. This is how Plato stopped the regression. But this that is discovered is only intuited by inference, and not laid down.
When Hegel understands the essence of reality he marches with Locke. He takes gravity to be the ground of the senses. What does the Element name, and what is the element? We understand directions: it is ‘on the corner’, ‘at the crosswalk,’ or ‘by the Starbucks,’ without further ado. Directions harbour us in the same waters. These high seas secure the peculiarity of the shared essence without ever demonstrating the existence of it, they only imply it when the storm comes. Situated, we remain properly ourselves, and do not make the mistake of becoming alienated and letting ourselves creak in the winds. In the sense of reality, nothing is mournfully alien,--not at all. But, if we have, through the presence of the aura of what is most dark, come to sense reality at all, we have come only to the relatively real, to the essence of what is absolutely real. Thus, the real is taken upon itself as a knowing of what is choate. But this 'knowing' is accidental to the cohateness of the perfect.
Gravity appeals to the sense of touch, and to pain. It is the solidity of the solid in Locke. It was easy work to toss off the other senses. We close our eyes but not our touch, or our sense of pain. What is true, is the richness of the rich man born to money, for it is natural. This is Aristotle’s explanation for our preferring the rich to the nouveau rich, that we are more impressed with the belonging of what has always been so, to the truth of the man. Truth is what is longest most stable. Everything near by is not known, but it can be asked about. What is it? It is an executive toy. But mostly what is there is known.
To truly understand the sense of meaninglessness we would have to be indifferent to pain and pleasure. One would, in addition, have to be indifferent to one’s indifference. The concept of the concept, not only of the indifference, and of the feeling, would stand there in its bluntness. Meaninglessness appeals to the concept of the concept in its comprehensive prominence. Meaninglessness remains, at first, an abstract-theoretical possibility. Because it rests or lies down in this predicament. It is only inferred by the passing of the meaning of the concept along the surface of gravity. But when it is considered that there are those born without the sense of touch, that feel no pain, and that likewise certain drugs can, in a frenzied state, bring about this lack, one gets a more concrete sense of the matter. Thus, the one with ‘closed’ touch, standing in a dark room, can not direct themselves out. Unless by smell or perhaps with the tongue, not insofar as it touches, but if taste could guide one. We say of such people, they have no ‘sense of self preservation.’ These are the poles of the old thought, self rule, rationality, pointing towards the inner emotional gravity, and self preservation, pointing towards what is most reliable in behaviour.
When so-called philosophy, seen schematically according to its spoken thought, traditionally, holds to its essence, it relies most on what is close by. Thus it is biographically visible in its practice. When it speaks generally, it comes back, and asks whether what is posited can be confirmed by what is at hand. That someone is in this room, that the ground is hard, and that hair grows when cut. One looks to what is said most simply, and comes to the essence of the emotional propensity that is purposive. But what is learned, most of all, is a question of the mode to be grasped. This mode is an art of time. I.e., of giving direction to time. It is not the experience, but the going on in the way one is shaped. A ‘young thing’ might have ‘been around the block’ and still be a young thing. We find insight in the things that are said, without strictly demonstrating a thing. A ‘young thing’, it seems, does not entirely posses a knowledge of ‘how it goes’ in such a way as to be independent of all literal doings. Experience does not at once perfectly realize itself in the one who has the experience, and thus being ‘experienced’ stands apart from experience as if standing back in its own shadowy path. Then the giving of direction stands against the accidental alien indirectiveness of the certain presence of the shadowy path.