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The Greek Designation of the Animal, or Life Simply.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Wed Feb 19, 2014 7:32 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Clarification (in après coup):


There is a deer in the headlights, captivated. Imagine this captivation broken by someone shouting the word car. Imagine now this deer has a human mind. The word makes the situation flash into shape, and the deer dart out of the way of the oncoming car. This is the register in which Aristotle makes the penultimate and the genuine definition operate. It goes from the word, to the general ground of that thing, to the specific difference. The word already contains the key to unlock being, but with the genus we find out more about what we are doing. Car, a vehicle, specifically one that is made for road travel; a road vehicle. To get the gist of the situation we only need the word. With the habitual understanding, and the systematic understanding, we come to negotiate by special accurate technique the possibility of the art of, say, driving, or crossing streets.

Everything in classical Greek thought remains tied to the car as a thing that is not matter, but rather a thing that is rather ambiguous, one can say of the many parts of the car that one does not know how many can be removed before it is no longer a car. All of Aristotle occurs in this space of the exhibiting of being, and not in an abstract zone where math describes things as if with indifference to the persons speaking.

This is rather like modern phenomenology, but with the profound difference that the depiction of what is there is teased out from natural doxa first and foremost, and not from an abstract demand for a clear-sighted picturing.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Thu Feb 20, 2014 2:38 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Why a deer? Why not a man? Your deer with ta da-sein is a man is'nt it?

Quote:
All of Aristotle occurs in this space of the exhibiting of being,

Give an example of this straight from Aristotle, in Greek if you like (to avoid historical doxa) or English - but either with the Bekker numbers - I'm genuinely interested. One often hears this type of thing spoken but usually the speaker resorts in the end to quoting Heidegger. It would be refreshing for some one to take the bull by the horns and give a direct quote. Then I feel discourse would proceed.

By the way, I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Thu Feb 20, 2014 4:21 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

When I say I don't necessarily disagree with you, it depends on what sort account you give of yourself. Just as did Parmenides (cf. Sophist), Heidegger, without meaning to, has created some very dark catacombs for latter-day sophists to hide away in.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Sat Feb 22, 2014 11:07 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
Why a deer? Why not a man? Your deer with ta da-sein is a man is'nt it?


I say, 'now imagine a human mind', and thereby I mean one prepared for logos, but quite without logos. As a match, to strike so that it burns like fire. Once burning, it can not be un-struck.

Dasein means, already, having come to be through logos. Being there, being about named things. Talking about folks like Felix (we wish to see for ourselves how naming, and so speaking the name, the singular individual’s name, is different than doing something like evoking through the poem that ‘lets be’ and does not speak about what is about, all the things and folks and events that are about us, as ordinary speech does. The poem wishes to evoke the whole of being). My wish, here, with this example, is to go to the moment of the lightning flash, the beginning of being; when the gleam delineates all that is about us.

It’s difficult to accomplish this trick since we are talking to ourselves all the time in thought. And, in meditation (of course, I am only coarsely treating this matter), or some such mental fitness-work, we blot this talk out, either by causing the thoughts to stand as a kind of pseudo-emptiness through repetition, or by destroying ordinary reason altogether. That’s not the same as the animal that has not yet spoken a name and so has not called the world into being. Also, for certain reasons, being on this view, is not vanished in anything like Nirvana. That is a kind of 'nothingness on its own ground' (with reference to Nishitani.)

But why do you make a plenary dodge so far as the question is concerned, about growth, art, and fortune?
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Sat Feb 22, 2014 11:37 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

I missed your genuine question, for the deer question. All this I have explained to you time out of number, now again we must look at it, since we have not yet broken the spell.

‘All of Aristotle occurs in this space of the exhibiting of being,’

We can see that, as I said, by noticing that Aristotle makes no division between substance and form. There is no formally correct, substantively false syllogism in Aristotle. Again, we can see this if we consider that for Aristotle, for example, justice is a habit. Aristotle’s whole teaching, that hangs on the theory of becoming, shows this.

That means that there is no knowledge apart from being, i.e., I can not know what is right and yet not do what is right. The Christian addition of transcendence (grace) is the beginning of this; that I know (always already as a genuine human being what is good) and choose to do good or evil (and thus all men are men in god, by this fact, in the Christian teaching), in the Thomistic sense, is unknown to the Greeks.

Again, in the later period, in modernity (before we spoke of medieval Christianity) there is theory; there is no theory in Aristotle, no Cartesian dualism. No pure reason apart from the phenomenal world. The idea is not for the Greeks theory (as if to say for some idle speculations, with perhaps the character of a pure heuristics, not unlike a pure math), but the basis of man's world: his moral universe (for Aristotle contemplation is the highest aim of man as man!).

In modernity there is not morality, but rather the causally thought how. A murder and an eclipse are subject to the same question, how did it happen causally? That questioning is indifferent to man as man. One can make this more explicit, but it requires a seminar length exposition. One needs to think this over, and see it, these vignettes need to point us to our own thinking and lives.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Tue Feb 25, 2014 3:48 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I see, now, with greater clarity (thus for a third time the cock crows, the pharisees speak):

It doesn't really matter what we find in Aristotle, we are not philologists. Do you really want to know what Aristotle thought, or what Plato thought, after all, they may have been simple fools? We want to get to the center of the Tootsie Pop, that’s all.

So here the claim could be taken to be only that by using Aristotle and Plato we can get closer to the question about exhibiting. But, up to now we have not even said what that is. Saying what it is doesn’t mean saying the last word, it means only pointing to it, or avoiding trivial ambiguity. The real ambiguity is what we are researching, that is our field of research.

Exhibiting means the difference between that something there when we come, eg, out of solitary confinement in San Quentin after thirty years, and see a box with symbols, and do not find a mobile phone. The difference between what is there and the mobile phone for example is what the matter of exhibiting is about. That is analogous to the example about reading, which you have consented to understand, saying, if you allow it to recure, that we will not find words on the open page if we can not read.

--

P.S.

Whoever wants to understand the claim as understood by the Historicists, who reigned supreme for several hundred years before the domination of the authority of science, must starting with Vico follow through to Troeltsch, and then go on to Heidegger. Those will be their authorities; to see the view itself they must, rather than trying to prove the negative out of Aristotle, discover in history when the views said not to be in classical Greek thought emerged historically. That is necessary since otherwise we will simply find everything already in Plato and even in Heraclitus, and we will even call it charity, that we find it there, yes, they were very smart we will say, they thought already as we do.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Mon Mar 03, 2014 11:56 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Thank you for those insights.

Quote:
<<Talking about folks like Felix (we wish to see for ourselves how naming, and so speaking the name, the singular individual’s name, is different than doing something like evoking through the poem that ‘lets be’ and does not speak about what is about, all the things and folks and events that are about us, as ordinary speech does. The poem wishes to evoke the whole of being).>>

I’m always happy to talk, in my own way – which is the norm on this thread - about things that interest me. Everything has boundaries that we hardly understand or even notice. We didn’t come into the world like that. It is of great import to the young child’s padeusis – note their grave attention when learning about them. They are fascinated by them in ways that the grown up has entirely forgotten – what is bounded, what is unbounded; what is, for some unknown reason, allowed and what is forbidden
.
Perhaps that is what you are talking about here. Peras, limit; where there are limits there are boundaries. Where there are no limits there are no boundaries. A point for instance is not a limit and therefore has no boundaries, whereas a dot is a sign for a point and has a boundary, as do all signs. You can place a dot next to another so that their boundaries touch, but you cannot do the same for a point.

Signs have formal and informal boundaries. The informal boundaries are more difficult to see. A smoking cigarette with a line through it extends its informal boundaries to those it concerns. Both types are fascinating to the small child, but then, like Eliot’s ‘strong brown god’, are forgotten within the smaller boundaries of adulthood.

Plato was taught by his senior staff at The Academy to be mindful of boundary and interval, that every interval has two boundaries, whence the obsession for Pythagorean superparticular ratios: 1:2, 2:3 and 3:4 were seen as the founding bonds of music, for example. The Greeks were able to evolve the geometry of the Babylonians by a similar insight. They saw that, where it was the norm for Mesopotamians to use a single sign, let’s say ‘a’, for a length (that is, ‘interval’), they, the Greeks, realised that if the line was instead named after its boundaries as, say, AB, this would evolve a science to accommodate things that could not be conceived before, such as means (arithmetic, harmonic and proportionate) between extremes. This gave them a whole new logos capable of constructing advanced proofs of theorems which the Babylonians and Sumerians knew about instinctively but had no means (alogos) of confronting.

Forgive me (as I forgive you) for asides such as this, but they spark something akin to the lightning of the deer you quoted from the Seventh Epistle in a person like myself.

You have instituted a fascinating boundary in your comments on Felix the cat, who through no fault of his own, when being called in the dark for his supper, is proclaimed for his fertility, fortune and success. And, as you say, there is quite a different situation when a cat enters through the bounds into poetry. How do you see the bounds that demarcate the poetic sign? They exist, I agree, but the boundaries and the contents are exceedingly subtle. For example, I might begin a poem

“Cause, Essence, Beauty, triple fountain head
“Of Self’s sweet wisdom …”

I have no impetus to explain those words to you or any one else because they are not conversational but merely arrive verb-less and without preposition etc. but holon in themselves, and set, as Shakespeare put it, in the tables of the heart. What follows may indeed unsettle them as I begin to tread the razor’s edge of poetic expression – that is, as I try to remain within the boundaries of the poetic sign. If I tripped and fell outside those invisible bounds I, and any poet, would know at once that my words were no longer poetically said.

But this is all extremely subtle. The perai are the lords of what can be exercised within the sign. Here is an example, I look at the poster (as I did as a child) entitled The Rules and Regulations of the Upper Clapton Railwaymen’s Club, to which my grandfather belonged. It proclaims its boundaries, and to me as a child even the paper it was printed on seemed full of authority and forboding as did the thick black border that enclosed it, certainly different to all surrounding paper – all who enter these perai will abide by their rules.

You see these thresholds everywhere, on calling cards, leaflets through the door, on bank-notes, ensigns, coats-of-arms of all sorts. Perceive the perai in a certain, I would call 'proper', way and you are suddenly outside them, as a poet, or an artist or a philosopher. Are you getting me? I hope so! That’s why a poet can take the “The Rules and Regulations of The Upper Clapton … etc.” and carefully place them, not within their own bounds but within poetry's bounds. This is what much twentieth century art was about, a poetic resetting of the prosaic. That is all Warhol and others did.


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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Tue Mar 11, 2014 3:33 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

“Perhaps that is what you are talking about here. Peras, limit; where there are limits there are boundaries. Where there are no limits there are no boundaries. A point for instance is not a limit and therefore has no boundaries, whereas a dot is a sign for a point and has a boundary, as do all signs. You can place a dot next to another so that their boundaries touch, but you cannot do the same for a point.”

Yes, that is perhaps so. The Greeks know nothing of points. Points only become audible with Leibniz (or one must at least say: sometime after Descartes, although certainly they are prepared by the Church Fathers).

If limit is then metaphysical, defining, then there is also what is pre-metaphysical, the μέτρα as measure which does not yet operate abstractly as with Plato’s geometry. For in Plato there is the transmission of a tradition planted by the few and carefully tended by competent initiates, and which is very far from the sentiment of the many.

Thereby we must understand poetry as not binding in the fashion of limit as the word abstracted from speech does. But we must see that the expression is living. Here, if not apposite to the utmost, I present what is a least an intersesting diversion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SthKs40ClCY

However, in Plato and Aristotle I would say we err if we assume there is anything like the modern theoretical physics departure that you seem to indicate (that a matheme operates as a recondite function and reveals what can not be thought). For that would require us to find in number something that represents, here there is no idea of representation as if in a brain. The soul in Plato is immanent as are the opinions that Aristotle reads his ideas out of. This is a particularly treacherous ground.

Consider this study which is much closer to us in time to see what caution I am striving to bring to the sight of our stupified faculties, which go along unweary of the greatest difficulties: http://books.google.com/books?id=9QPFH1tpLC8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=Prefrence&f=false:

--

If we speak of Felix within a grammatical deixis we err, the tacit speaking of an écriture can not possibly lie in an illiterate people who sing. For Homer, or the many Homer’s, logos is of various and versicoloured measure and a deep millennial becoming is therein spoken: thus he is thinkable as a text in so far as, for example, the dialogues of Plato gives us polyphonic voice: Socrates speaks differently to this and that interlocutor. But the Homeric text is stratified within itself by the bringing together of many singers before many live and rapt participants (not merely listeners).

The poem can not be thought apart from participation. Thus there is no poetic speech as such, but there must be great poets as well. That there are great poets means also that there are those who can read the poems as they are required to be read. Tacitly this presupposes that the poet is not bound by the being of, for example, what a Starbucks is to the folk of this or that popular culture, or to the remote mud-brick dweller who comes upon that structure willy nilly, but that there is a versicoloured unveiling. Here there is not the collapse of distinctions or contradictions but the opening up of a more various view.

If Aristotle speaks of analogy, that is to speak of the engine of meaning is it not? Teleology, not this or that teleos, precedes metaphysics (not this or that sound, but hearing). Poetry names, if you ask me, for Aristotle, the most general, not the singular as you claim. It names that that is barely located at all. Whereas the consummate definition locates with precision.

--

If we speak of parameters as dividing lines we thus think into what has preceded such theoretical notions. Thus there is a grave danger. This is the same as the seductive anachronism of teleology prior to metaphysics. But such things seem useful at the outset, for otherwise how to locate the ground?

This goes for the speech about the whole or holon too. The whole means I say there is a mountain, and do not know what quantity can be removed before there is no mountain, or for example how many hairs can remain on a head that is not as yet thought as bald. Already this whole is perhaps a dealing clumsily with metaphysics that goes towards syllogistic and thus rigorous logical lock-downs.

Here I do not purpose to speak of a mechanics of estrangement or a deterritorialization as if of a distorting and stretching of playdough putty (which ‘resets the prosaic’). The sign then would be the goop. Here we must not dare speak of signs. We speak then of what is audible to the listening participant. We must herein go beyond all signs in this poetry.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Tue Mar 11, 2014 7:07 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I thought we might have a serious conversation but I believe you are not understanding anything I’ve written here. Perhaps you ought to read it again with your thinking cap on. Or, better still, demonstrate your thoughts on poetry with a few lines of your own.

What you say about the point is, of course, factually wrong, but then, maybe you were just being argumentative.

I suspect we have reached a stalemate and am willing to suspend our discourse eternally if you are. But as forum moderator I feel bound bound to respond as best I can, wretched though that 'best' may be.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Fri Mar 14, 2014 1:36 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

You say: A point for instance is not a limit and therefore has no boundaries

My thought: Leibniz. The only point that is no limit is the monad. Where is such a thing in geometry of any kind? A point is precisely a limit.

Perhaps what you intended to say about the thing you call point is that it is indivisible? We could litigate that out of, for example, Euclid if you wish:

σημεῖόν ἐστιν, οὗ μέρος οὐθέν.

A point is that which has no part.

Breaking down these Greek words, with a few references to their usage in the ancient texts, and no pretensions to philology, may be elucidating.

To start with:
Tufts prefers to say 'mark' Wiktionary gives: σημεῖον • (sēmeion) (genitive σημείου) n, second declension
a mark, sign, token
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Fri Mar 14, 2014 8:21 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I know you are cunningly dangling an irresistible bait before me and of course I will bite..

Quote:
My thought: Leibniz. The only point that is no limit is the monad. Where is such a thing in geometry of any kind? A point is precisely a limit.

I suspect here that he is referring to the fact that the monad has severed its connection with the physical world. A point has place but no dimension whereas the monad has neither place nor dimension. That does not deny anything I was saying. The very fact that the point can be placed on a line and divide it in the way I mentioned in my previous post makes it the beginning of my wonder and perplexity. Plato would talk of three distances and four limits - τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους where horous may stand for limit or boundary.

So why to go to Leibnitz - the wonder had been largely lost by then? He had other fish to fry. Before the Enlightenment even drew a breath Leonardo talked of the point in the Greek way. Plato and the Academy (the source of much of Euclid) differentiated between Parmenides’ sphere which had parts by way of a boundary and a centre, and the part-less point. The monad or pure mathematical unit was according to Socrates also indivisible, but the Greek approach is not easy to comprehend. For example they had no real concept of a number line. But this is a subject worthy of our genuine theoria rather than being brought forward as an aside.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Sun Mar 16, 2014 10:15 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

I think the point in classical geometry names the opening of relational thinking, and it means there are true limits that do not bound objects as bodies. In that we can see something of what occupies modern university professors, eg, sociologists and so-called philosophers, under the rubric of structuralism.

The monad, on the other hand, which was prepared by the conceptual bridge of the 'thought of god' with the Church Fathers and Schoolmen becomes the noumenal world in Kant. After Kant we find that speaking of what is outside the spatial temporal by way of purposing a content for it makes no sense (it has no meaning [eg history, the lives of men], no teleology). Yet this thinking still persists as a question under the rubric of Dasein, as that which clears a world, it has the dimmest of connections to this earlier problem of relations from which it sprouts.

Poetry is the answer to the question, what is thinking? Here poetry refers not to beautiful words: 'the austerity of letting be' means that words are allowed to be thoughtful, and in this thoughtfulness of language we may see something of what for the Greeks was still meant by beauty as the ordering, or cosmos.

Here we can not learn about this through repeating in a formal manner the way to this problem, by defining it again and again, but if we can locate it we must go beyond it at once. And so find it in all its sharpness and newness; for we must always think anew and not go to sleep.

In this endeavor, which we have hitherto treated with alarming carelessness, I find that what would help us would be to have a yardstick, thus I ask you again about the three terms in the Laws. Will you obstinately refuse to let us know about these? I think we need them to jump forward here.

Here the assumption is that we can not go into the trans-temporal and trans-spatial [which, indeed, do not exist], but we can think into what is. Dasein, I wonder, perhaps quite crudely, if this thinking can be conceived of as a growth, that has not risen to the coming into a techne.

The problem in the work of exhibiting in the Greeks and as far as your reading of Warhol, if you ask me, is that that remains on the ground of POV, we haven't yet made clear to ourselves the demarcation between what is thought as POV, which is the same as the historical movement of teleology, and the question about being. POV belong to the way Dasein was understood still in the 17th and 18th centuries, but in Being and Time (that someone has given particularly powerful expression to this or that idea which is a problem for us all should not be taken too seriously, one can not allow oneself to abide with or be locked too long beside this or that thinker) the reading which says being-there (actuality), drops entirely out of sight, and the question of the clearing comes to us, as a putative movement (there is here a relation between the sense of a moment, and the meaning of movement which brings us back to Aristotle in a flash; and the shivering moment has something in it of the thoughtfulness of language which captures these various things-alongside-things in an original way).
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Mon Mar 24, 2014 9:41 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

My research has brought me to the standard answer to your previous question, about why the Greeks are in Hegel entirely understood as exhibiting. You ask to be pointed to this in Aristotle. Thus you must look to the Categories, which is the Greek answer to the question how something is predicated of the matter that is there. As opposed to the scientific answer, that there is there an object treated by a subject. (here we leave unsaid the medieval view) If we wish to think again out of immediacy without the interference of the object and subject, we must go then to Kant who was the first to dispose of this doubling, showing that an ‘abyss’, as he says in the Critique of Practical Reason, opens into freedom (here we do not point to, eg, Schelling), that it can only be stopped in its contradictory, antinomy, as against the weight of gravity, by reason as thought as the simple judge of all that hangs over its head, it is this that Heidegger also returns to thus giving the other answer to the Enlightenment question about prejudice; that one removes it by returning thus to Aristotle, in so far as one stays close to what one knows, and does not like the fools dabble in pure thought (or what is called ‘theory’ in the modern and not Aristotelian sense, since, of course, with the latter it is always rooted in immediacy, and so unlike the former does not serve to disturb the thinking part of the community in its noisy efforts), in this: the problematic here is that the return to a ‘new beginning’ is thought out of the end of philosophy.

Hegel speaks of the matter of exhibiting when he mentions the sun alongside forgetfulness, the ‘emotions’ speak then of wonder: In the geographical survey, the course of the World's History has been marked out in its general features. The Sun— the Light— rises in the East. Light is simply a self-involved existence; but through possessing thus in itself universality, it exists at the same time as an individuality in the Sun. Imagination has often pictured to itself the emotions of a blind man suddenly becoming possessed of sight, beholding the bright glimmering of the dawn, the growing light, and the flaming glory of the ascending Sun. The boundless forgetfulness - the forgetting of the self, unawareness only seeing these objectives the absolute, no awareness, self conscious strictly-of his individuality in this pure splendor, in his first feeling is utter astonishment. But when the Sun is risen, this astonishment is diminished; objects around are perceived, and from them the individual proceeds to the contemplation of his own inner being (his own inner sun), and thereby the advance is made to the perception of the relation between the two. Then inactive contemplation is quitted for activity; by the close of the day man has erected a building constructed for his own inner Sun; and when in the evening he contemplates this, he esteems it more highly than the original external Sun. For now he stands in a conscious relation to his Spirit, and therefore a free relation. If we hold this image fast in mind, we shall find it symbolizing the course of History, the great Day's work of Spirit.

Exhibiting means thus that I am in relation with, but not alongside of that which I speak of. I do not add myself to the substance when I say that is a small box. Whereas, the modern way is to break apart the smallness of the box, and show that to be an evaluation of a subject, and to further show the box to be a self-representation of an object. Thus one encounters an autonomous object. Whereas in exhibiting we do not encounter, but we bring ourselves into awareness of what we stand in relation to, as the one who knows about this or that.

Thus we must ask if we who have gone through the thinking of objects can erase what is known, we stand here in the end of metaphysics. In that we are connected to the plenum of all the ages how can we not be in History, thus we see why it is said that we stand in the end of History. The activity of exhibiting from the end of Philosophy is not to be thought as the activity of the Greeks, but only in conversation with that activity. Therein we have an opening to speak of being, as the background as yet not thought by us, we must think it new each time we consider the matter, that requires that we make clear the way to it.

Exhibiting thus the small box and the cell phone, making ourselves aware of them in their conceptuality with logic by way of defining and speaking, we see that something is left unthought in exhibiting, namely the movement between the two witnesses, that of the exhibitor who finds a world of a box and that of the same matter thought as a phone. Exhibiting in this way brings us to History, but history is neither thinkable nor experienceable in exhibition. It sits in the background. So long as History moves, it seems a process and a dimension, but in its closure it suggests being as the indefinite background between the earth, which opens to the first relation of mortals with gods, and the sky which is the closure in the full presence of beings as a totality.

Thus, also, from the ancient sources in regard to your question, we see that there is for the Greeks no vouchsafe, of objective measure, so that of, eg, responsibility (ἀρετή "arete") with the Greeks is a matter only of breeding and capacity. Whereas for us there can be no true responsibility, because all opinion about this is of the subject and of POV, and does not stand in the objective world as that which is of itself in the ideas, which are thus subjective fancy in the End of Philosophy.

We live in wordy times, thus I end my report, only, though of course I see you are not fit for these journeys, as your preference is to stay with authority and the professors, and depend on that, still, I can not help deploring your refusal to help us with the crucial information about the 3 terms in the Laws which we must think new again as from another beginning.
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Peter Blumsom



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PostPosted: Mon Mar 24, 2014 11:18 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Your wordy missive looks interesting and I will give it my attention as soon as I am able. And you even managed to behave yourself until the last paragraph:

Quote:
We live in wordy times, thus I end my report, only, though of course I see you are not fit for these journeys, as your preference is to stay with authority and the professors, and depend on that, still, I can not help deploring your refusal to help us with the crucial information about the 3 terms in the Laws which we must think new again as from another beginning.

You are a peculiar fellow. How is it possible that you demand my attention to a passage in Laws and yet give no reference? If you mean 895d why not say, or if not, it's only polite to let me know. And who is 'us'? Is there a group of you bent on giving me a work out; or is it the 'royal 'we''? If you are so self important then it's probably for the best that I don't shoot from the lip and take time to furnish you with a worthy reply. I promise you that I will give this matter attention but it will be in my time.
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Richard Wongkew
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PostPosted: Thu Mar 27, 2014 11:21 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

You’re, I hope, quite right that I am too hurried. We are perhaps in no great hurry, and it would be as well, in that case, if we will by that procedure learn more, to keep back the technological essence. I can not help but saying, here we are probably right if we speak of an essence and not a drive. If we were to speak here of a drive we would perhaps stay with language, but it is through language that we wish to learn of its grounds, the background, or being. Truth comes through langauge, but the grounds that can not be thought nor found with the eyes is supposed by this way of proceeding to have its domain behind this.

On the other hand, it is not certain how essence is to be divided from drive, but the difference is that drive gives us no historical reference in regard to itself (I don't mean in regard to the theory).

You mean that you yourself don’t live in wordy times? I think one could say just as well that one lives in noisy times, full of frantic doings. It’s the best of times, and so on. Now, I don’t think those terms must come from the Laws, that is just an idea. But, to have a yardstick, which you yourself vouch for, allows a seminar-like situation to open. So then you might justify the we to yourself on the basis of a participatory-like character. Although, I suppose, nowadays these questions are mostly forgotten and the fact that we ignore requests made repeatedly is to be expected.

Of course, here, also there is the question about the sense of ‘one’, it is possible to allow the pronoun here to speak to our purpose, in so much as it is a binding term, that names the horizon. Yet, the talon of a bird of prey also binds. As perhaps does a wash basin. That can be brought close to the question about the one and the many.

If one says ‘we’ the idea is, it seems to me, of a collection of this or that participant. Meaning of those that come together and can again go away. But, in saying ‘one’ the sense is of what is always, and thus not dependent on spatial coming together, but on what one calls a shared horizon. This ‘one’, it seems to me, can be understood as the same as Dasein, that is the same term. It does not mean ‘being there’, but rather something more akin to the way thinking gives any world.

One looks up into a totally black sky, there is the lightflash of the lightning that gives the primitive sense of directedness.
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